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Harris: Check Yes for Checkpoints

NOTE
Check Yes for Checkpoints: Suspicionless
Stops and Ramifications for Missouri
Motorists
State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. June
28, 2016)

Conner Harris*

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the great advantages of living in a free society is the enjoyment of
general privacy and freedom from unwarranted interference in one’s personal
affairs. This advantage benefits citizens in both their private and public interactions. For example, it is expected one could drive to the store across town,
the mall in a neighboring city, or somewhere on the other side of the country
uninterrupted and unhindered. The primary exception to this privacy expectation is that engaging in conduct that violates the law can warrant a stop and
seizure by law enforcement.1
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution codifies this
privacy expectation as a right to be enjoyed by all within its reach.2 Specifically, the Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”3 Drawing the line between reasonable and unreasonable is a task with
which courts often wrestle. This line has a direct impact on how police officers
perform searches and seizures and how the subjects of those searches and seizures are treated in the criminal justice system.
A general component of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.4 However, police checkpoints – designated locations which require passing vehicles to stop and submit to a police
*

B.A., Truman State University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2018; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018. I would
like to extend a special thank you to Associate Dean Paul Litton for his comments, as
well as the entire Missouri Law Review staff for their support and guidance in writing
this Note.
1. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1609, 1613 (2012).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Jason Fiebig, Comment, Police Checkpoints: Lack of Guidance from the Supreme Court Contributes to Disregard of Civil Liberties in the District of Columbia,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 599, 606 (2010).
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officer’s questioning – have been upheld as constitutional in both federal and
state courts as a permissible method of instigating a seizure without individualized suspicion.5 Checkpoint jurisprudence at the federal level has not yet
resulted in concrete requirements for reasonableness, but there are general underlying principles.6 Missouri courts have likewise abstained from providing
any sort of checklist before a checkpoint may be considered reasonable7 but
instead seem to judge each checkpoint on a case-by-case basis, often yielding
inconsistent results.8 A recent decision by the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District, State v. Biggerstaff, indicates that checkpoints designed to
enforce vehicle equipment laws, also known as enforcement checkpoints, may
be set up at any location, at a moment’s notice, and for an indefinite duration.9
This Note explores and discusses the repercussions of this decision. Part
II of this Note explores the facts of State v. Biggerstaff in detail. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of police checkpoints under federal law and in the
state of Missouri. Part IV examines the reasoning and holding of the Southern
District of Missouri in State v. Biggerstaff. Finally, Part V comments on the
Southern District of Missouri’s rationale in reaching its holding, as well as how
this decision will apply to motorists in the future.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Stacy Biggerstaff was stopped on April 17, 2013, in the early afternoon
at an equipment enforcement checkpoint in Taney County, Missouri.10 The
checkpoint’s purpose “was to enforce traffic safety laws, with a focus on driver
qualification and the condition of the motor vehicles’ safety equipment.”11 Evidence obtained during the stop resulted in Biggerstaff being charged with possession of a controlled substance, driving while intoxicated, and driving with a
suspended license.12 Prior to trial, Biggerstaff motioned to suppress evidence
resulting from the traffic stop on the grounds that the checkpoint violated state
and federal constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.13
Two relevant documents were admitted into evidence: General Order 6402, which was promulgated by the Missouri Highway Patrol, and Special Order
24, which was issued by and applicable only to Troop D, the branch of the

5. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
6. See Fiebig, supra note 4, at 605–12.
7. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 514 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo.

June 28, 2016).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 515.
10. Id. at 513.
11. Id. at 515.
12. Id. at 513.
13. Id. at 514.
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Missouri Highway Patrol with jurisdiction over Taney County.14 Both orders
laid out general guidelines for conducting checkpoints.15 The special order
included a list of approved locations for checkpoints during daylight hours.16
The locations were “selected by zone supervisors for the purpose of reducing
property damage, injuries, and deaths caused by unqualified drivers and defective equipment on motor vehicles.”17 Deciding checkpoint location was a matter of convenience, “the actual choice [of checkpoint location] would then be
made based upon where the troopers to be used to man the checkpoint were
working at that time.”18
The checkpoint itself consisted of two police cars, both with their emergency lights activated.19 The officers on site stood in the roadway wearing
police uniforms and reflective vests.20 Additionally, “[e]very vehicle that approached the checkpoint was stopped.”21 The stops took as little as thirty seconds and consisted of a routine driver’s license check plus an officer checking
the functionality of one piece of vehicle safety equipment, such as a turn signal.22 Biggerstaff did not have a driver’s license when she was stopped at the
checkpoint and was directed to pull over so the officer could further investigate.23 It was during this investigation that the officer determined that Biggerstaff was intoxicated.24 She was subsequently arrested and charged.25 Biggerstaff motioned to suppress evidence obtained from this checkpoint on the
grounds that it was unconstitutional.26
Biggerstaff argued three primary issues at trial: (1) the location of the
checkpoint was not determined using specific data; (2) the checkpoint was conducted without written procedures; and (3) there were no signs, signal flares,
or otherwise sufficient forms of notice to warn approaching traffic of the checkpoint.27 The court found that two of Biggerstaff’s three main contentions – a
lack of written instruction and sufficient notice – were directly refuted by the
evidence in the case.28 The court further noted that it was not a requirement
for a checkpoint’s location to be selected based on specific data indicating

14. Record on Appeal – Transcript at 7–8, Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. Ct.
App.), transfer denied (Mo. June 28, 2016) (No. SD 34001).
15. Id.
16. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 515–16.
25. Id. at 516.
26. Id. at 514.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 516.
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heightened probabilities of criminal violations.29 Location was merely one factor to consider in a balancing test.30 The trial court found that the checkpoint
was not unreasonable and denied Biggerstaff’s motion to suppress evidence.31
Upon her subsequent conviction, Biggerstaff appealed this denial to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District. The Southern District of Missouri
affirmed the trial court and held that the checkpoint was not unconstitutional
because Biggerstaff failed to show that the checkpoint was unreasonable.32

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Individualized Suspicion and Reasonableness
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”33 The analogous section of the Missouri Constitution states, “[T]he people shall be secure
in their persons, papers, homes, effects, and electronic communications and
data, from unreasonable searches and seizures.”34 The prohibition against only
“unreasonable” searches and seizures indicates that reasonable searches and
seizures are acceptable.35 The reasonableness of a law enforcement action “is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”36
The Fourth Amendment’s demand for reasonableness relies heavily on an
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.37 Individualized suspicion is “the
idea that the state should judge each citizen based upon his own unique actions,
character, thoughts, and situation,” and not “on stereotypes, assumptions, guiltby-association, or other generalities.”38 Individualized suspicion is the “beating heart” that keeps people secure in their person and property and deters unreasonable government intrusion.39 Its purpose is to limit the amount of discretion a law enforcement officer may use.40 For example, in Delaware v.
Prouse, the Court held that roving traffic stops cannot occur without at least
reasonable suspicion that the driver is violating the law or is subject to a lawful
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 516.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 15.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
Andrew E. Taslitz, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The
Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
145, 146 (2010).
39. See id. at 145.
40. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/17

4

Harris: Check Yes for Checkpoints

2017]

CHECK YES FOR CHECKPOINTS

909

seizure.41 This was in part because traveling in automobiles is an everyday
occurrence for many Americans, and their expectation of privacy necessarily
follows them to their automobile in order to preserve the integrity of the Fourth
Amendment.42
Police stops are considered seizures for constitutional purposes.43 Generally speaking, searches and seizures conducted without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing are unreasonable.44 However, under very limited conditions, suspicionless stops are considered reasonable.45 Fixed police checkpoints have been upheld in both federal and state courts as a reasonable method
of instigating a seizure without individualized suspicion.46

B. Supreme Court Rulings on Checkpoints
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld checkpoints with specific primary purposes, such as intercepting illegal aliens at international borders47 and locating intoxicated drivers and removing them from the road.48 In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court upheld a checkpoint located near the United States’s southern border because, despite fairly intrusive
stops requiring passengers to present certain documents and answer personal
questions, the United States government had an incredibly strong interest in
securing its border.49 In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court upheld a checkpoint designed to stop drunk driving because the
intrusion was relatively small – the average delay was twenty-five seconds50 –
compared to the State’s interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road.51
However, even these reasonable checkpoints must meet minimum criteria
to pass muster.52 A constitutional checkpoint bars an officer from exercising
“standardless and unconstrained discretion.”53 In general, the primary purpose
of the checkpoint must be “closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.”54

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
Id. at 662–63.
See id. at 653.
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 40.
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448.
Id. at 455.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–43 (2000).
Id. at 39 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)).
Id. at 41. But see Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004) (upholding a
checkpoint stop when the purpose was to gather information from motorists and not to
identify unlawful conduct).
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The Supreme Court case City of Indianapolis v. Edmond involved a
checkpoint designated to intercept illegal drugs.55 The checkpoint was operated by approximately thirty officers pursuant to formal instructions issued by
the chief of police.56 When a motorist stopped at the checkpoint, a drug dog
walked around the vehicle and sniffed for illegal narcotics.57 The checkpoint’s
location was selected in advance based on crime statistics and traffic flow
data.58 Signs were also posted to notify motorists of the checkpoint’s location.59
The Court took no issue with how the checkpoint was conducted.60 Instead, it held that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment because its
primary purpose was to “uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”61 According to the Court, confiscating drugs did not immediately serve
the purpose of securing the border or preserving roadway safety.62 The government argued that all checkpoints ultimately share the goal of arresting suspected criminals.63 The Court warned that permitting a checkpoint with such
a broadly stated purpose would allow checkpoints to be set up at the whim of
law enforcement.64 Regulating the purpose of suspicionless intrusions is relevant because it deters abusive police conduct.65 To combat situations where
police administer checkpoints with impermissible purposes under the guise of
lawful stated purposes, the Court must consider all available evidence to determine the primary purpose of the checkpoint.66 Without this judicial safeguard,
suspicionless stops would occur with undue regularity, and a primary purpose
of the Fourth Amendment would be rendered moot.67

C. Checkpoint Law in Missouri
In Missouri, the law on checkpoints is largely the same as federal law.68
The provision contained in the Missouri Constitution that protects against unreasonable searches and seizures is “interpreted to provide essentially the same

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 42.
See State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 626–27, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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protection found in the [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution.”69 Missouri courts share the Supreme Court’s conclusions regarding the
constitutionality of checkpoints.70 Two Missouri cases are frequently cited
when Missouri checkpoints are at issue.71 One, State v. Welch, is an example
of how to design a reasonable, court-approved checkpoint.72 The other, State
v. Canton, is an adept illustration of precisely how not to conduct a checkpoint.73
State v. Welch involved a sobriety checkpoint that was designed according to a prepared plan and operated by supervisory personnel belonging to
Troop F of the Missouri Highway Patrol.74 Previously collected data indicated
the checkpoint’s location was an area where frequent alcohol-related accidents
occurred.75 A command officer of Troop F personally issued the order to conduct the checkpoint, which included “specific guidelines, locations, and times
to be followed by field personnel.”76 All personnel assigned to work the checkpoint met prior to its commencement to discuss their duties and received
printouts of the commanding officer’s order to consult.77 This order also set
protocols for various situations that may arise during the checkpoint, such as if
traffic slowed to the point of unreasonably delaying travelers.78
Furthermore, a sign reading “Sobriety Checkpoint Ahead” was posted to
notify oncoming traffic of the checkpoint, and signal flares were placed along
the roadside to guide approaching vehicles.79 Police cars were positioned
around the area of the checkpoint with their emergency lights activated, and
officers wearing reflective vests directed traffic with flashlights.80 All of these
factors contributed to the court’s finding that the checkpoint was constitutional.81
On the other hand, the court found that the checkpoint in State v. Canton
was unreasonable because it lacked nearly every factor of reasonableness found
in Welch.82 The checkpoint in Canton was designated to check for vehicle
defects, the validity of the operator’s license, and intoxicated drivers.83 It
lacked any prior notice and consisted of only two patrol cars with flashing
69. Id. at 631 (quoting State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Mo. 1985) (en

banc)).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 624; State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 625–26.
Canton, 775 S.W.2d at 352–53.
Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 625.
Id.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 632–33.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 633.
State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352, 353–54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 353.
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emergency lights and two officers with flashlights.84 The number of officers
was problematic because the checkpoint had to cease its operation whenever a
violation was suspected.85 The checkpoint’s location was decided by “the originating officer on some non-defined general awareness that some arrests had
occurred in the area” and not by specific data.86 The officers involved were
not adequately trained nor were there established guidelines for conducting the
checkpoint.87 Under the circumstances, “[a] driver approaching the scene
would have no idea what was occurring, what his response should be, or why
he was being stopped.”88
Welch and Canton leave us with two extreme examples of checkpoints
but not a lot of middle ground. Ultimately, the validity of a checkpoint “is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”89 Balancing
tests require that certain factors be considered in determining reasonableness –
not that certain elements be satisfied.90 Not all of the factors considered in
Welch need to be present for a checkpoint to be considered valid.91
Another Supreme Court of Missouri case, State v. Damask, reiterated the
importance of proper notice and a logical location.92 The Damask checkpoint
featured large illuminated signs that warned of an approaching checkpoint.93
The court stated that notice reduces the intrusion of the stop to the motorist on
a subjective level by alleviating potential concern or surprise.94 Hence, “there
should be some prior notice of the existence of the checkpoint.”95
The actual location of the checkpoint in Damask was situated at a trafficcontrolled intersection at the end of an exit ramp.96 The signs were purposely
ambiguous so that motorists might think that the checkpoint was straight ahead
on the interstate, past the exit ramp.97 The exit led to few advertised roadway
services, making it more likely that those who did exit were attempting to avoid
the perceived checkpoint on the interstate, only to find themselves stopped at
a checkpoint on the exit ramp.98 The court approved of this location because

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 354.
Id.
State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 633.
92. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 575 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 574.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 575.
97. Id. at 568.
98. Id.
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it considered a controlled intersection to be a relatively safe place to stop vehicles and because the location specifically targeted drug couriers expected to
prematurely exit from their route to avoid law enforcement.99 After considering these factors, the court upheld the checkpoint because “[t]he checkpoint
plan and operation virtually eliminated the officers’ discretion in stopping vehicles.”100

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Biggerstaff, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, determined that the checkpoint at issue was constitutional after balancing the relevant interests.101 Essentially, the Biggerstaff checkpoint had enough factors to
tip the scale of the balancing test toward reasonableness, despite not possessing
all of the Welch factors.102
Biggerstaff argued that the checkpoint was unreasonable for three reasons.103 First, unlike in Welch, the checkpoint did not provide sufficient notice
to motorists.104 Welch was held constitutional in part because of the notice
provided to motorists.105 In Welch, a sign reading “Sobriety Checkpoint
Ahead” was displayed alongside the road before motorists encountered the
checkpoint and illuminated signal flares were placed at the checkpoint’s location, where officers with reflective vests and flashlights guided traffic.106 Biggerstaff argued that the notice was insufficient because it was less apparent
than in Welch.107
While not expressly commenting on the specific issue of notice, the court
adopted the position of the trial court by stating that the evidence available
“refutes Defendant’s claims that no . . . signs or other warnings were given to
drivers about the checkpoint.”108 The two police cars parked on the side of the
road with their emergency lights activated provided enough notice to satisfy
the court.109
Second, Biggerstaff argued that “no written procedures were implemented and provided to field personnel.”110 The court rejected this argument
outright, pointing to the State’s Exhibit 8 in evidence, which included both

99. Id. at 575.
100. Id.
101. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo.

June 28, 2016).
102. Id. at 515.
103. Id. at 514.
104. Id.
105. State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
106. Id. at 625.
107. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 514.
108. Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 515.
110. Id. at 514.
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Special Order 24 and General Order 64-02, two documents that provided general guidelines for conducting checkpoints.111
The court did not analyze the caliber of instruction provided by the Special Order or General Order, and the court seemed satisfied that any level of
instruction guided the effectuation of the checkpoint.112 The court noted that
prior to conducting the checkpoint, the officers involved “met together briefly
. . . and they went over how [the checkpoint] was to be conducted.”113
Third, Biggerstaff argued that the checkpoint was unreasonable because
its location was not chosen based on specific data indicating high rates of illegal activity or accidents.114 The court recognized that this was true but found
a caveat in Special Order 24 that contained a list of approved checkpoint locations.115 These locations were approved by a Zone Supervisor in the Troop at
the recommendation of other officers.116 While it was not based on scientifically-gathered data, the pre-approved list of locations weighed in favor of reasonableness.117
Regardless of how the checkpoint location was decided, the court expressly declared that specific data was not required when choosing the location
for a checkpoint because “Welch does not require such evidence, and the
checkpoint in Canton was not found to be constitutionally deficient solely because of the lack of [specific data].”118 Ultimately, the court’s decision to uphold the checkpoint rested on its assertion that Biggerstaff did not adequately
demonstrate that law enforcement officers had unbridled discretion in conducting this checkpoint.119

V. COMMENT
Biggerstaff departed from precedent in several ways. First, it moved the
fulcrum of the balancing test so that the state’s interests prevailed. Second, the
notice factor was gutted and rendered practically meaningless. Third, the court
was very deferential to the police orders that authorized the checkpoint. This
deference significantly diminished the importance of logically selecting a
checkpoint’s location. Fourth, Biggerstaff upheld a checkpoint with a generally stated purpose. Finally, the Biggerstaff checkpoint permitted unbridled
police discretion in almost every facet of its operation.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 516.
Id.
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A. A Balancing Test: State Interest vs. Fourth Amendment Intrusion
A law enforcement officer’s search or seizure of an individual is only
lawful if it is reasonable.120 A reasonable search or seizure occurs when the
state’s interests outweigh the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.121 In
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court of the United
States permitted suspicionless seizures at checkpoints designed to target drunk
drivers.122 However, the Court has since limited the extent of that power by
holding that checkpoints designed merely to detect general criminal wrongdoing are unconstitutional.123 In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court identified specific circumstances under which suspicionless seizures would be acceptable, stating “[o]nly with respect to a smaller class of offenses, however, is
society confronted with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and
limb that the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz was designed to eliminate.”124
The state’s interest in stopping drunk driving is strong due to the enormous danger drunk drivers bring to the roadways.125 The Court used illustrative language to describe exactly what conduct the state is most compelled to
stop, even at the temporary expense of individual privacy interests.126 A definition of “immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb” is not provided by
the Court, but the plain meaning indicates that the Court is addressing only
issues of roadway safety that impose a present and substantial risk of serious
bodily harm.127 A threat such as drunk driving qualifies as such a risk because
alcohol significantly impairs one’s cognitive and motor functions, which
makes operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol an extraordinarily dangerous task.128
The state’s interest was significantly weaker in Biggerstaff where the purpose of the checkpoint was merely to check the equipment of a motorist’s vehicle to ensure its functionality.129 While it is undeniable that a vehicle is safer
if all of its signaling equipment is working properly, a defective turn signal
does not capture the urgency of the “immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life
and limb” with which the Edmond Court was so concerned.130 In fact, trial
court testimony from an officer on the scene indicated that there was no reason
for a turn signal to be activated at the location of the checkpoint because it was

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979).
Id. at 654.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000).
Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.
Id.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43.
Alcohol and Driving, ALCOHOL & DRUG FOUND., http://adf.org.au/insights/alcohol-and-driving/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
129. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 6.
130. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43.
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a straight stretch of road.131 A defective turn signal in that circumstance certainly does not meet the temporal element of “immediacy,” let alone the label
of “vehicle-bound threat to life and limb.”132
Furthermore, the state’s interest in maintaining roadway safety through
properly functioning safety equipment is already served to a certain degree because Missouri requires all vehicles registered in the state to submit to regular
vehicle inspections.133 In Prouse, the Supreme Court used a similar rationale
when it held that roving suspicionless stops were unconstitutional.134 The
Court further stated that even out-of-state vehicles need not arouse suspicion
or be stopped because the states in which they are registered likely have similar
minimum safety requirements as the required vehicle inspection.135 The
Prouse court was adamant that “[t]he marginal contribution to roadway safety
possibly resulting from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every
occupant of every vehicle on the roads to a seizure.” 136
Prouse is distinguishable from checkpoint cases because it involved roving suspicionless traffic stops – seizures enacted by actively patrolling officers.137 Checkpoints are static;138 however, the Prouse decision requires a powerful justification to stop drivers without suspicion.139 Prouse maintains that
even if discretion is eliminated by stopping “every occupant of every vehicle,”
the state’s interests do not outweigh any individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights.140 Essentially, even the complete elimination of police discretion does
not alone make a stop constitutional.141 This rationale applies to the Biggerstaff
checkpoint because every driver who passed that checkpoint was stopped.142
The Prouse Court’s observation that these stops only provide a “marginal
contribution to roadway safety”143 places them far below the Edmond Court’s
“immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb” standard.144 These stops
also do not meet the requirements of the Welch court, which provided “essentially the same” protection as the Fourth Amendment.145 Biggerstaff departed
from precedent by relaxing the standard for suspicionless stops and finding that
131.
132.
133.
134.

Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 39.
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43.
MO. REV. STAT. § 307.350 (2016).
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660–61 (1979).
135. Id. at 661.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. See id. at 656–58.
138. Id. at 663.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 661.
141. Id.
142. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 515 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo.
June 28, 2016).
143. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
144. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000).
145. State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting State v.
Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)).
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the state’s interest in conducting equipment enforcement checkpoints outweighed an individual’s privacy expectation.

B. The Notice Factor
A number of factors are considered when a court determines the constitutionality of a checkpoint.146 These factors include: whether or not there was
a specific plan of action in conducting the checkpoint; how closely that plan
was followed; the amount of prior notice given to motorists; the reason for the
location of the checkpoint; and the general room for the exercise of officer
discretion.147 Biggerstaff upheld the constitutionality of the checkpoint at issue
despite the weight of these factors – most notably notice and checkpoint location – being significantly less than in Welch.148
Biggerstaff’s comment on notice creates a major concern pertaining to the
constitutionality of checkpoints. That concern is the subjective intrusion imposed on motorists.149 Subjective intrusion is defined as “the amount of discretion available to the officers in operating the checkpoint and the extent to
which a stop may generate concern or fright on the part of lawful travelers.”150
A motorist’s expectation of privacy includes an expectation of freedom from
arbitrary invasions including subjective intrusions.151 Prior notice would alleviate the issue of concern or fright by providing a motorist with a prior explanation for the stop and lessen the degree of subjective intrusion.152
The Biggerstaff court held that the presence of police officers and police
vehicles with activated emergency lights sufficed as notice,153 despite the Canton court’s concern that drivers should be able to reasonably discern that they
are entering a checkpoint.154 The mere presence of police officers and their
vehicles on the side of the road may look substantially similar to any investigatory stop or law enforcement practice. Without more to indicate that a checkpoint is in effect – such as signs, illuminated flares, or notice published in the
local paper – motorists may question why they are being directed to pull
over.155 The Supreme Court of Missouri has advocated for proper notice for
checkpoints as a means to lessen the degree to which checkpoints “generate
concern or fright.”156 In State v. Damask, the court drew an unambiguous conclusion regarding notice, noting that “there should be some prior notice of the
146. Id. at 632–33.
147. Id.
148. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo.

June 28, 2016).
149. State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 573–74 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
150. Id. at 573.
151. Id. at 571.
152. Id. at 574.
153. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16.
154. State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
155. Id.
156. Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574.
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existence of the checkpoint.”157 Damask transformed notice from a factor into
a requirement.
Biggerstaff’s rationale regarding notice is tautological; if mere visibility
of police cars and officers provides sufficient notice, then notice is almost always sufficient. Unless the cars are completely hidden from view, they will
always be visible as drivers approach them, and a court following Biggerstaff
could conclude that motorists were adequately alerted to the existence and nature of the checkpoint. There must be something more to the notice requirement that Damask alluded to than the bare minimum standard Biggerstaff provides; otherwise, there is little value in considering notice in a reasonableness
analysis.

C. The Need for a Plan
The use of a designed plan for conducting checkpoints is also frequently
cited as a factor for courts to consider.158 In Biggerstaff, the court deferred
heavily to the police special orders and did not question whether the six pages
of checkpoint locations were logical.159 These locations were approved by superior officers at the suggestions of lower ranked officers,160 but the court did
not question the methodology of selecting locations.161 This suggests that officers may approve any location with the understanding that the court will not
step in.
Testimony from an officer who worked the checkpoint at issue indicated
that in practice, the checkpoint’s location depends upon where officers are located at the time.162 When and where a checkpoint will be is decided approximately one hour before vehicles are first stopped at the checkpoint.163 The
court had no issue with this timeframe but gave no guidance as to whether a
time lapse was necessary or if checkpoints could be set up spontaneously.164
The court again showed deference to the discretion of law enforcement on a
matter where discretion is explicitly intended to be minimized.165
In fact, the court went a step beyond deferring to the special order. It
completely waived the location factor from its consideration.166 Prior to Biggerstaff, checkpoint jurisprudence in Missouri either indicated that a location
should be selected because collected data indicated heightened rates of traffic
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. See id. at 574; Canton, 775 S.W.2d at 354; State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624,

633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
159. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 515–16 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied
(Mo. June 28, 2016).
160. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 11.
161. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16.
162. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 30.
163. Id. at 28–29.
164. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16.
165. See id.
166. See id.
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violations in the area167 or because the layout of the checkpoint prioritized
safety and would primarily target criminals.168 The location of the Canton
checkpoint was not logically selected and was held unconstitutional.169 The
creators of the Biggerstaff checkpoint did not rely on specific data when deciding on a location, and the court did not comment on whether the location was
otherwise acceptable.170 The court acknowledged that location is one factor to
be considered, but how the location is determined is not discussed in the court’s
opinion.171 As indicated above, the Biggerstaff court stated, “Canton was not
found to be constitutionally deficient solely because of the lack of [specific
data].”172 Under Biggerstaff, a checkpoint can still be constitutional even if the
location is not logically selected. The abrogation of the location factor’s significance, along with the court’s treatment of the notice factor, allows for a
checkpoint that is quite different from the gold standard set forth in Welch.173

D. General vs. Specific Purpose
Checkpoint standards are ultimately derived from the fundamental components of the Fourth Amendment and the general prohibition against suspicionless stops.174 Checkpoints provide a narrow exception to this prohibition,
and the Supreme Court reminds us that it is indeed narrow:
If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would
be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks
for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing
the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in
crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.175

Essentially, the less specific a checkpoint’s purpose, the less likely it is that it
will be upheld as constitutional. Biggerstaff does not conform to this rule.
First, the equipment enforcement checkpoint in Biggerstaff had a purpose that
appeared to be serving the general interest of crime control and not the specific
Supreme Court-approved purposes of policing the border or ensuring roadway
safety.176 Its primary purpose was to “reduce property damage, injuries, and

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
See State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 575 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16.
See id.
Id. at 516.
See State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
Id. at 42. The term “roadblock” here is used interchangeably with “check-

point.”
176. Id. at 41.
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deaths caused by unqualified or unsafe drivers and defective equipment on motor vehicles.”177
Not only was this purpose facially general, it exceeded the general interest
of crime control. The population of “unqualified or unsafe drivers” could encompass nearly everyone, depending on where the line is drawn. While driving
with defective equipment is a criminal violation, being merely an “unsafe”
driver is generally not. Driving with music blaring is potentially “unsafe,”178
but it is not unlawful or criminal. The court offered no guidance regarding how
to define these terms and was apparently content with a checkpoint that was
originated to detect “unsafe” drivers.179 The Biggerstaff checkpoint’s stated
purpose was even more general than that of the unconstitutional checkpoint in
Edmond, which at least targeted a type of criminal wrongdoing.180
Second, these broad enforcement checkpoints are easier to set up in Missouri than checkpoints with specific purposes, such as sobriety checkpoints.181
Enforcement checkpoints may be approved by a zone supervisor or assistant
zone supervisor on site and require no further approval from Troop Headquarters.182 In contrast, sobriety checkpoints are governed by a separate order from
enforcement checkpoints and require authorization from Troop Headquarters
before being conducted.183 This produces an incentive for law enforcement to
set up general purpose enforcement checkpoints instead of specifically tailored
sobriety checkpoints. As Biggerstaff demonstrates, officers at enforcement
checkpoints are still capable of making drunk driving arrests,184 and they do
not have to jump through extra hoops to create sobriety checkpoints, which
achieve the same ends. This practice sharply contrasts with the Edmond decision that warned of the potential dangers of allowing law enforcement to spontaneously set up checkpoints.185

E. Back to Basics
Each of the issues discussed are problematic on their own; when aggregated, a new singular concern arises with the Biggerstaff decision. Biggerstaff
reverts to pre-Prouse territory when roving suspicionless stops were not constitutionally constrained. Biggerstaff has upheld enforcement checkpoints with

177. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 33.
178. See Warren Brodsky & Zack Slor, Background Music as a Risk Factor for

Distraction Among Young-Novice Drivers, 59 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 382
(2013).
179. State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 515–16 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied
(Mo. June 28, 2016).
180. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
181. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 40.
182. Id. at 11–12.
183. Id. at 40.
184. Id. at 9; Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 513.
185. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
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general purposes.186 These checkpoints can be set up on site by anyone with a
sufficient rank and without approval from Troop Headquarters.187 A lack of
meaningful notice combined with a court’s complete deference, or even indifference, to a checkpoint’s location opens the door for these checkpoints to be
set up at anytime, anywhere.
A bit of creativity would transform Biggerstaff into a powerful law enforcement tool for effectuating seizures without the requisite individualized
suspicion. Police could essentially target a vehicle, or person therein, and place
a checkpoint on its predicted path. The stated purpose of the stop would be to
conduct a standard enforcement checkpoint, but in reality it would only be a
pretext188 for further investigation. This practice is not quite the same as the
roving stops that Prouse discontinued because the officers would be operating
from static checkpoints instead of moving patrol vehicles, but it is only one
step removed. In stark contrast to established precedent, the location of the
checkpoint and the individual to be stopped are left to the unbridled discretion
of the officers at the scene.189 This is antithetical to the notion that constitutional checkpoints are those crafted precisely to minimize “standardless and
unconstrained discretion.”190
Unconstrained discretion allows certain biases, whether deliberate or implicit, to surface. For example, research suggests that African-Americans are
disproportionately stopped by police compared to Caucasians.191 While racial
profiling by law enforcement is technically unlawful, evidence resulting from
an otherwise reasonable seizure is not deemed inadmissible simply because of
perceived racial profiling.192 The subjective motives of police are irrelevant
when considering the reasonableness of the seizure.193 All that matters is that

186. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 516.
187. Record on Appeal – Transcript, supra note 14, at 40.
188. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). Police stops are labeled

as “pretext” stops when their given reason does not align with the subjective motives
of the officer. Id. For example, an officer may pull a motorist over for speeding because the officer suspects the motorist is a drug courier. The traffic stop for speeding
was only a pretext so that the officer can further investigate his or her suspicions. These
types of stops are lawful because the subjective thoughts of a police officer have no
bearing on whether a law enforcement practice is objectively reasonable. Id.
189. See Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d at 515–16.
190. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661
(1979)).
191. See, e.g., Steven Hayle et al., Race, Street Life, and Policing: Implications for
Racial Profiling, 58 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 322, 337–38 (2016);
Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Policy Department’s “Stopand-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N.
813, 814 (2007).
192. Lewis R. Katz, Whren at Twenty: Systemic Racial Bias and the Criminal Justice System, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 923, 928 (2016).
193. Id.
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the requisite reasonable suspicion be met prior to the effectuation of the seizure.194
Profiling also occurs in other forms.195 Profiling of out-of-state drivers is
a growing concern now that that there are inconsistent marijuana laws across
the country.196 A recent Tenth Circuit decision ruled that reasonable suspicion
does not arise simply because a driver is a resident of a state that has legalized
recreational marijuana, and it further decries targeting drivers because of their
out-of-state license plates.197 However, Biggerstaff-approved checkpoints can
be used to effectuate pretext stops that perpetuate racial biases, while allowing
police to circumvent prohibitions against residency and license plate profiling.198
The checkpoint in Welch was upheld because all of the factors that were
considered met the bar for reasonableness.199 Welch is today’s gold standard
for Missouri checkpoints because it shows exactly how a proper checkpoint
should operate.200 Holding each factor of a checkpoint to a high standard helps
the overall goal of minimizing police discretion and Fourth Amendment violations.201 Biggerstaff diminished the importance of these factors, which in turn
granted officers the exercise of greater discretion at the expense of individual
privacy interests.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Biggerstaff decision significantly relaxed the standard normally applied to checkpoints. Edmond provided a straightforward outline of how a constitutional checkpoint should look,202 and Welch demonstrated how a constitutional checkpoint operated in practice.203 The checkpoint in Biggerstaff did not
resemble either of these examples in that it altered the traditionally used balancing test, abrogated the notice factor, weakened the need to logically select
a checkpoint location, had a generally stated purpose, and permitted unbridled
police discretion.204
State v. Biggerstaff has implications for motorists in Missouri. This type
of checkpoint is now the checkpoint law in Missouri, despite falling short of
194. Id.
195. See Hayle et al., supra note 191, at 337–38.
196. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; Adult and Medical Use of Cannabis

Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 475B.010–475B.395 (West 2017).
197. Vasquez v. Lewis, 834 F.3d 1132, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2016).
198. See State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 515–16 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer
denied (Mo. June 28, 2016).
199. State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 631–32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
200. Id. at 625, 631–32.
201. Id. at 627.
202. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–42 (2000).
203. Welch, 755 S.W.2d at 625, 631–32.
204. See State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513, 513–16 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer
denied (Mo. June 28, 2016).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/17

18

Harris: Check Yes for Checkpoints

2017]

CHECK YES FOR CHECKPOINTS

923

standards set in Welch.205 This decision narrowed the scope of reasonableness,
but it did not explicitly say what is unreasonable.206 This decision opened the
door for police to conduct checkpoints wherever and whenever they want – so
long as basic guidelines are followed.207 The Supreme Court of Missouri recently declined to review Biggerstaff, meaning that as of the time of this Note,
it is binding law across Missouri with no foreseeable chance of being overturned.208 Biggerstaff reduced the number of reasonableness factors that must
be present for a checkpoint to be constitutional and gutted the present factors
of much of their protective bite, making police stops easier to effectuate and
subject to less scrutiny.209

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 516.
Id. at 515–16.
Id.
Id. at 513–16.
Id. at 515–16.
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